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In the 1990s, Southeast Asia experienced very rapid growth 
associated with large and persistent current account deficits.1 The 
episode lasted from 1990 to around 1996, ending with the outbreak 
of the Asian crisis in 1997–98. Current account deficits peaked at 
around 10 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in Malaysia in 
1995 and at 8 percent of GDP in Thailand in 1996 (compared with 
7 percent in Mexico around the time of the peso crisis in 1994). 
Deficits were also large in the Philippines and Indonesia, at around 
4 percent of GDP. During the crisis years of 1997–98, deficits became 
surpluses that persisted for years (in the Philippines this occurred 
much later). Malaysia’s surpluses rose to around 15 percent of GDP 
after its crisis, whereas they declined in Thailand (turning to a small 
deficit for a time) and Indonesia. The current account reversals to 
surpluses were associated with a sudden stop in capital inflows, 
which significantly exceeded current account deficits in the first half 
of the 1990s, but which had not recovered their previous levels by 
2006. The reversal was largest in Thailand, where net capital flows 
switched from an annual average inflow of $21 billion in 1995–96 
1. I draw on the experiences of the four countries in Southeast Asia where current 
account sustainability was an issue in the first half of the 1990s, namely, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. For reference, I include data on Singapore, 
which consistently maintained large surpluses during this period. 
Current Account and External Financing, edited by Kevin Cowan, Sebastián 
Edwards, and Rodrigo O. Valdés, Santiago, Chile. © 2008 Central Bank of Chile.
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to an outflow of $13 billion in 1997–98 (a reversal of $34 billion). 
Indonesia saw its capital flows swing from an $11 billion inflow to a 
$5 billion outflow. The reversals were smaller in Malaysia and the 
Philippines (from $9 billion to 0 and from $8 billion to $3 billion, 
respectively). By way of comparison, Singapore also experienced an 
increase in capital outflows of $11 billion over the period, but it had 
a current account surplus of around 15 percent of GDP.
The sudden stop episode was associated with sharp contractions 
in output that were unprecedented in Asia over the sample period. 
The 1998 absolute drop in output was largest in Indonesia and 
Thailand, although the swing in output in Malaysia was second 
only to Indonesia. In the Philippines, the drop in output was 
comparatively modest. Singapore experienced a more severe drop in 
output, in part reflecting the country’s economic links to neighbors 
with sharply declining outputs, such as Indonesia. These declines in 
output were followed by relatively quick recoveries but permanently 
lower growth. 
This paper argues that the drive for economic growth contributed 
to current account deficits and influenced policy responses. It is 
organized as follows. The first section describes current account 
developments in Southeast Asian economies from the saving-
investment and trade perspectives. The second section focuses on the 
experience with current account deficits in the period leading up to 
the sudden current account reversals of 1997–98. I review arguments 
made at the time (some of which are still made today) suggesting 
that current account deficits were sustainable. The third section 
discusses fiscal and monetary policy responses with open capital 
accounts. I also address the use of capital controls prior to the crisis 
and the impact they may have had on current account balances or 
sustainability. The final section offers some concluding observations 
on current account experiences in Southeast Asia.
1. CURRENT ACCOUNTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: STYLIZED FACTS
To provide some perspective on current accounts in Southeast 
Asia, table 1 reports the balance of payments for the five countries 
in the sample, while figure 1 illustrates the evolution of national 
saving and investment and the current account in five Southeast 
Asian economies. The first point to emerge from the figure is that 
until the Asian crisis, saving ratios were high in Malaysia (peaking 
at nearly 40 percent of GDP in 1998), Thailand (averaging around 539 Experiences with Current Account Deficits in Southeast Asia 
35 percent of GDP in 1991–94), and—for a time—Indonesia (with 
a maximum of 38 percent in 1997), whereas the Philippines posted 
somewhat lower rates (with a peak of 25 percent in 1997). Saving 
rates fell significantly in all regions after the late 1990s. Thus the 
period of current account deficits was associated with higher saving 
rates than the more recent period of current account surpluses.







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Second, fluctuations in the current account tend to mirror 
movements in investment rather than saving. The switch in current 
accounts from large deficits to large surpluses around 1998 largely 
reflects first surging investment and then its collapse below national 
saving in most countries in the sample. In particular, the emergence 
of current account surpluses in 1998 was associated with relatively 
stable saving ratios in Malaysia and Thailand and a fall in saving 
in Indonesia and the Philippines. On an annual basis, deviations 
in investment from trend are also more closely correlated with 
fluctuations in the current account than are deviations in saving 
(table 2). The drivers of investment spending in Southeast Asia, and 
its perceived sustainability and efficiency, are thus of particular 
interest for understanding fluctuations in the current account. To 
provide perspective, a comparison with Singapore reveals striking 
contrasts. Singapore maintained large and growing current account 
surpluses in this period, and saving rather than investment was 
more closely correlated with the current account. Indeed, investment 
spending was stable and national saving increased, although output 
growth reached double digits in the first half of the 1990s (see table 
A1 in the appendix).
Table 2. Correlation of Saving or Investment with Current 
Account Balancea
Country






Indonesia –0.08 0.10 –0.50 –0.36
Malaysia 0.48 0.48 –0.93 –0.93
Philippines 0.20 –0.04 –0.80 –0.86
Singapore 0.69 0.72 –0.34 –0.47
Thailand –0.37 –0.58 –0.97 –0.97
Source: IMF; Bank for International Settlements (BIS) calculations.
a. As applied to detrended annual series as a percentage of GDP. Trend series are estimated using the Hodrick-
Prescott filter.
b. More specifically, excluding values from 1997–98.
Figure 2 illustrates trends from the perspective of merchandise 
imports and exports in U.S. dollars. In Indonesia and Malaysia, 
merchandise trade was in surplus or nearly balanced throughout the 
period; deficits were explained by other components of the current 543 Experiences with Current Account Deficits in Southeast Asia 
account. Merchandise export and import revenues both grew rapidly 
during the period of current account deficits in the first half of the 
1990s, although import growth exceeded export growth over certain 
periods in the first half of the 1990s in Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and Thailand.2 The large increase in trade surpluses 
after 1997 in a number of cases reflected a sharp drop in imports and 
a failure to keep pace with export growth thereafter. This is broadly 
in line with the view that imports were closely related to investment 
spending, which also declined sharply (see below).




2. The trend in Singapore is not all that different, except that exports begin to 





a. Other includes services, income, and transfers balance.545 Experiences with Current Account Deficits in Southeast Asia 
The conventional wisdom is that the Asian current account 
surpluses observed in recent years reflect rapid export growth, or what 
might be described as Bretton Woods II.3 Export growth has indeed 
remained a key driver of growth in Southeast Asia, and it contributed 
to recovery from the 1997–98 crisis.4 However, export revenues 
grew more rapidly and steadily during the period of current account 
deficits (and more stable exchange rates) than they did after 1996. 
The reversals of current account deficits to large surpluses around 
1998 did not reflect strong or booming exports. On the contrary, in 
spite of steep currency depreciations, export revenues in U.S. dollars 
contracted in 1998 in all countries in the sample but the Philippines 
(where export revenue growth fell to 17 percent from 23 percent a 
year earlier). Imports fell by more, however, resulting in the current 
account reversals. Outside the crisis period, between 1990–95 and 
1999–2005, average annual merchandise export revenue growth in 
U.S. dollars fell in Indonesia (from nearly 13 percent to 9 percent), 
Malaysia (20 percent to 10 percent), the Philippines (15 percent to 5 
percent), and Thailand (19 percent to 11 percent). 
Other components of the current account have also been relevant. 
The tourism industry is a significant contributor to current account 
surpluses in Thailand: the service account represented about a third of 
dollar inflows on exports, services income, and transfers in the 1990s 
and somewhat less than a quarter in the 2000s. In the Philippines, 
trade in goods and services comprised the bulk of the current account 
until 2001, when overseas workers remittances began to play a major 
role in turning the current account consistently to surplus (figure 2). 
In 2005 remittances totaled $10.7 billion, corresponding to about half 
the sum of services income and transfers in the current account versus 
$40 billion for merchandise exports). In Malaysia, trade surpluses 
have been offset by significant deficits on the nonmerchandise trade 
components of the current account.
1.2 The Importance of the Exchange Rate in the 
Current Account
The exchange rate’s influence on the behavior of the current 
account is an important issue in small open economies like those 
in Southeast Asia. Calderón, Chong, and Loayza (2002) study the 
determinants of the current account using a panel data set of forty-four 
3. See Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2004).
4. See Guidotti, Sturzennegger, and Villar (2004).546 Ramon Moreno
developing countries, with annual data for 1966–94. They find that 
current account deficits are modestly persistent and rise with a real 
exchange rate appreciation, although this last effect is small. They also 
rise with an increase rise in domestic output growth and an increase 
in the terms of trade, but fall with faster growth of industrialized 
economies or higher interest rates.
Turning to Southeast Asia, some insights on the role of the 
exchange rate can be gained from a study on Thailand’s current account 
by economists at the Bank of Thailand (Chayawadee and Jantarangs, 
2004). The authors first estimate a single equation model of Thailand’s 
current account with the lagged current account, the real effective 
exchange rate, trading partner output, domestic output, terms of trade, 
and a crisis dummy. They find that the impact of the real effective 
exchange rate is small: a 1 percent increase in the real exchange rate 
lowers their current account proxy (namely, the exports-to-imports 
ratio) by a quarter of a percent. The impact of a 1 percent change in 
trading partner output on the current account is much larger, at nearly 
two-thirds of a percent. The impact of domestic output is smaller than 
foreign output, but it is still significant and higher than the effect of the 
real exchange rate. A vector autoregression (VAR) model (comprising 
the current account, the real exchange rate, the repurchase rate, and 
the production index) reinforces the impression of a weak impact of 
the exchange rate on the current account in Thailand.5 
Bayoumi (1996) provides evidence on the strength of exchange rate 
effects in the five Southeast Asian countries in the sample based on 
estimates of long-run trade elasticities (see table 3). These estimates 
suggest that changes in growth (particularly foreign) have a substantial 
impact on trade balances. Long-run income elasticities in the sample 
of Southeast Asian countries (including Singapore) average 1.8 for 
exports and nearly 1.4 for imports, with Thailand having far higher 
income elasticities than its neighbors. Bayoumi also directly measures 
5. Impulse responses indicate that an unexpected (one-standard-deviation) 
depreciation in the baht has a large impact on the current account (of 0.2 percent of 
GDP), but the impact subsides thereafter. Introducing exports and imports separately in 
the model reveals that the real exchange rate has a weak effect on these two variables. 
In line with this, much of the variance of the forecast error of the current account is 
due to its own innovations, particularly in the first year. After twenty quarters, own 
innovations still account for about half of the variance of the forecast error. (In their 
single equation model, the coefficient on the lagged current account is about 0.6.) Using 
the Bank of Thailand’s larger macroeconomic model, Chayawadee and Jantarangs (2004) 
find a much larger response of the current account to a real exchange rate depreciation 
than they do in their own model, but the effect also dissipates over time. 547 Experiences with Current Account Deficits in Southeast Asia 
the effect of changes in the real exchange rate on exports and imports; 
he finds that most of the coefficients are small and statistically 
insignificant, with the exception of Indonesian imports.6
Table 3. Southeast Asia: Long-Run Trade Elasticitiesa 
 
Income Price (real exchange rate)
Country Exports Imports Exports Imports
Indonesia 1.27 1.66 –0.32 0.68
Malaysia 1.86 1.47 –0.53 0.01
Philippines 1.34 1.65 0.10 –0.75
Singapore 1.77 1.05 –0.21 0
Thailand 2.73 1.03 –0.99 0.75
Memo
Japan 2.10 0.79 –0.69 0.55
United States 1.47 2.46 –0.86 0.26
Panel 1.96 1.46 –0.80 0.28
Source: Bayoumi (1996, tables 3-3 and 3-4). 
a. Unless otherwise indicated, the output coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level. The real exchange 
rate elasticities for exports for Asia are not significant except for Japan (1 percent), while for imports they are 
only significant in Indonesia (1 percent). Sample period is 1974–93.
Some features of trade in Southeast Asia may explain why exchange 
rate effects on the current account could be weak. First, exports have 
a high import content, which generally reflects the importance of 
manufactured exports in Southeast Asia.7 A high correlation between 
6. The perception that price effects are low and income effects are high in Southeast 
Asia was not limited to Bayoumi. Goldman Sachs (1997) reaches the same conclusion. In 
contrast, the finding that price effects are weak in Southeast Asian trade is contradicted 
by Marquez (2002). The combination of strong income elasticities and weak price 
elasticities may explain why Philippine exports sometimes rose while the real exchange 
rate was appreciating and fell while the real exchange rate was depreciating.
7. For example, according to input-output tables, the import content of exports 
in Thailand in 1995 ranged from 44 percent for computer and parts to 65 percent for 
electrical appliances and integrated circuits. In this setting, a depreciation of the 
currency that boosts exports could simultaneously be associated with an increase in 
imported inputs. This is also related to the high share of machinery or production inputs 
in imports and the presence of regional production networks. Indeed, Chayawadee and 
Jantarangs (2004, pp. 30–31) note that in one version of their VAR model separating 
Thai exports and imports, both increase in response to a depreciation of the baht. 
García-Herrero and Koivu (2007) also find that exports and imports (from Asia) in 
China move in the same direction in response to exchange rate changes. China similarly 
forms part of a production network in which a significant proportion of imports are 
used in exports.548 Ramon Moreno
merchandise exports and imports is apparent in Indonesia, Malaysia, 
and Thailand (as well as Singapore), particularly in the first half of 
the 1990s (see figure 2). 
Second, East Asian production networks determine imports and 
exports in a specific location (Ando and Kimura, 2003), which can 
dampen the impact of exchange rate fluctuations. A sectoral analysis 
by Chayawadee and Jantarangs (2004) similarly indicates that real 
exchange rate changes in Thailand have a relatively small effect on 
manufacturing trade, but a significant effect on agricultural products. 
They argue that in the case of Thailand’s integrated circuit industry, 
dominated by multinational firms, the volume of imports is primarily 
determined by parent company headquarters, rather than changes 
in the exchange rate.
Third, as noted earlier, Southeast Asian current accounts 
have significant nonmerchandise trade components, which are 
price insensitive. The real exchange rate’s impact on the current 
account may thus be weakened further by the small effects on these 
nonmerchandise components.8 
One final relevant aspect of the relationship between the 
exchange rate and the current account in Southeast Asia is that 
apart from having price effects, the exchange rate had offsetting 
income effects on the current account through its impact on 
capital flows. An exchange rate depreciation (or efforts to stem 
appreciation) that was perceived as unsustainable could worsen 
the current account balance by increasing capital inflows and, 
therefore, domestic investment spending.9 Pegging influenced 
capital flows in Southeast Asia, in particular, by exposing these 
countries to fluctuations of the yen against the U.S. dollar. Research 
suggests that in periods of yen appreciation, Southeast Asian 
economies (whose currencies tended to be stable or depreciating 
against the U.S. dollar) became more attractive destinations for 
Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, while imports 
in these economies also increased (Goldberg and Klein, 1998). This 
implies that, at the time, an effective trade-weighted depreciation 
8. For example, Chayawadee and Jantarangs (2004) report that real exchange rate 
fluctuations have little effect on the services account in Thailand. Overseas worker 
remittances in the Philippines may also be insensitive to exchange rate fluctuations: 
Vargas-Silva and Huang (2006) find that remittances are more influenced by conditions 
in the host rather than home country; in particular, exchange rates against the dollar 
do not help explain remittances in a set of emerging market recipients.
9. Greene (2002) finds that inflows supported domestic investment spending prior 
to the crisis.549 Experiences with Current Account Deficits in Southeast Asia 
of Southeast Asian currencies could be associated with more capital 
inflows and larger current account deficits.10 
2. WHY PRE-CRISIS CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICITS WERE 
NOT SUSTAINABLE
Large current account deficits were observed up to about 1997 and 
then reversed sharply. This current account cycle appears to reflect 
abrupt changes in the availability of capital flows. Starting in the late 
1980s, falling U.S. interest rates and recessions in industrial countries 
stimulated capital flows to Southeast Asia and other emerging market 
regions, as investors sought higher returns. Exchange rate policies in 
the Southeast Asian countries also helped attract capital. Capital flows 
were also supported by favorable domestic macroeconomic conditions, 
such as sound fiscal policies, rapid growth in output and exports, and 
relatively stable inflation that was not excessive by emerging market 
standards (see table A1). All these factors had a positive influence on 
market sentiment and capital flows.11 
The large current account deficits did raise concerns, but a number 
of arguments were presented to dispel them. These arguments, some 
of which are still brought up today, are generally founded on three 
basic issues. First, current account deficits reflected an excess of 
investment over (high) saving rates, as opposed to high consumption. 
Second, current account deficits were financed, in some cases, by 
non-debt-generating inflows, including foreign direct investment.12 
Finally, indicators of external debt sustainability appeared to be 
favorable. I discuss each of these points in turn.
10. In private correspondence, economists at the Central Bank of the Philippines 
pointed out a counterintuitive relationship between the exchange rate and export 
volumes. While the real trade-weighted peso appreciated in 1992, 1996, and 1999, 
export volume nonetheless grew during the same years. By the same token, real 
exchange rate depreciation in 1991, 1998, 2001, and 2003–04, was not associated with 
more rapid export growth. Bautista (2002) suggests that the Philippines’ international 
competitiveness is affected not only by movements in its real exchange rate, but also 
by trade policies and incentive structures. More generally, the uncertain relationship 
between real exchange rates and the trade and current accounts in Southeast Asia 
highlights the importance of a general equilibrium analysis that explicitly takes into 
account the effects of demand, supply, capital flows, and other factors that might have 
an important bearing on trade outcomes.
11. In a retrospective study of crises in the 1990s and the IMF’s role, Ghosh and 
others (2002) emphasize the importance of shifts in market sentiment in influencing 
external balance, in contrast to traditional IMF programs in which macroeconomic 
imbalances resulted in a gradual deterioration on the external side.
12. Banque Paribas (1995).550 Ramon Moreno
The first argument—that current account deficits reflected excess 
investment rather than high consumption—was often presented in 
contrast to Mexico, where external deficits were associated with high 
rates of consumption prior to the 1994 peso crisis, and cases in which 
current account deficits reflected public deficits. It was widely believed 
at the time that the association with high investment rates implied 
that the current account deficits were sustainable. Ostry (1997), 
using an intertemporal approach, found no evidence of excessive 
private consumption in Southeast Asian current account deficits, 
except to a small degree in Indonesia and Malaysia. The absence of 
excess consumption suggested that the fast-growing Asian economies 
were not necessarily experiencing the temporary and unsustainable 
spending booms that characterized the Latin American stabilization 
programs that lacked policy credibility (see Calvo and Végh, 1999). 
A 1995 private sector report refers to the “value-adding” nature 
of Thailand’s current account deficit as supporting the external 
valuation of the baht (Union Bank of Switzerland, 1995c). The 
Monetary Authority of Singapore (1997) draws on Singapore’s own 
experience to assess the current account deficits in Southeast Asia 
before the crisis. The study notes that the high investment rates in 
Southeast Asia were largely attributable to the private sector, which 
accounted for 76 percent of total investment in Indonesia, 66 percent 
in Malaysia, and 81 percent in Thailand. These investments had a high 
import content (resulting in higher import-to-GDP ratios and current 
account deficits), and estimates indicated that they were highly 
productive. For example, U.S. multinational investments in three 
Southeast Asian economies were estimated to have yielded higher 
rates of return (in US$) than they did in the European Community, 
Japan, or the newly -industrialized economies (that is, Korea, Hong 
Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan).13 One indicator that imports were 
used for investment is the high share of machinery in imports. Ando 
and Kimura (2003, table 1) estimate that the shares of machinery 
imports in 1996 were 42 percent in Indonesia, 63 percent in Malaysia, 
54 percent in the Philippines, and 50 percent in Thailand.14 The 
13. The Monetary Authority of Singapore (1997) also argued that such imports 
would eventually increase exports. 
14. The shares have since fallen in Indonesia and Thailand, remained stable in the 
Philippines, and risen in Malaysia. The Monetary Authority of Singapore (1997, table 4) 
confirms the high share of imports used in production. The shares of intermediate and 
capital goods in total imports were estimated to have risen sharply between 1975–77 
and 1990–94 in Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia. 551 Experiences with Current Account Deficits in Southeast Asia 
share was also high in Singapore, at 63 percent.15 
The second argument—that current account deficits were financed 
by non-debt-generating inflows—was supported by studies such as 
Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996), who, in searching for lessons from 
Mexico, suggest that this type of financing reduced vulnerability to 
crises. Frankel and Rose (1996) present similar results. More recently, 
Levchenko and Mauro (2006) conclude that FDI helps protect countries 
from sudden stops in capital flows.
This argument was also used to highlight differences between 
Southeast Asia and Mexico in the aftermath of the 1994 collapse of the 
Mexican peso.16 In 1991–97, FDI inflows averaged about 120 percent 
of current account deficits in Malaysia, 70 percent in Indonesia, 50 
percent in the Philippines, and 30 percent in Thailand. The Monetary 
Authority of Singapore (1997) noted that a high share of FDI financing 
was one factor that helped sustain Singapore’s own large current 
account deficits, which persisted from 1972 to 1984. FDI accounted 
for 83 percent of Singapore’s current account deficits in that period. It 
was argued that such financing was an indication that these current 
account deficits were efficient market outcomes, reflecting the flow of 
international capital to countries with the highest returns. 
A third argument was that indicators of external debt sustainability 
appeared to be favorable. The ratios to exports of external debt and debt 
service payments were generally low or seemingly manageable. Until 
1995, export growth in a number of countries appeared to be more than 
adequate to cover existing current account deficits, so that the debt-
to-exports ratios would converge to a level that could be serviced (not 
exceeding two digits).17 Ratings upgrades in 1995 typically cited rapid 
growth, as well as growth-boosting structural reforms (for example, 
the Moody’s upgrades for Malaysia and the Philippines).18 
2.1 Shocks and Vulnerabilities
In this setting, a number of shocks starting in late 1994 led to 
a progressive deterioration in market sentiment, while uncovered 
15. The perspective of the Monetary Authority of Singapore (1997) is of interest 
because it highlights some of the rationale for policies followed by Southeast Asian 
economies. A fuller exposition (and defense) of the Asian approach to development is 
provided by Stiglitz (1996). Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1999) offer a critical view. 
16. For example, see N. Sopiee, “We Are Not Going down Mexico Way,” New Straits 
Times (Malaysia), 14 March 1995. 
17. Dadush and Brahmbhatt (1995).
18. For a discussion of how the Philippines was perceived, see T. Shale, “Has the 
Philippines Found Its Feet?” Euromoney, September 1995.552 Ramon Moreno
vulnerabilities triggered currency collapse and a massive capital flow 
reversal in the region. Three shocks were prominent in the press 
and analysts’ commentary: the Mexican peso crisis; the slowdown 
in exports and the drop in the terms of trade; and the collapse of 
the Thai baht. 
The collapse of the Mexican peso in December 1994 led to 
market volatility and a debate on the extent to which Southeast 
Asian economies might (or might not) be as vulnerable as Mexico, 
which also had large current account deficits prior to its currency 
crisis. For example, an analysis by a U.S. investment advisor 
suggested that four of the seven countries whose currencies were 
most vulnerable to devaluation after the Mexican peso collapse were 
in Southeast Asia (namely, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, 
and Thailand).19 Although sentiment stabilized after a period of 
market volatility, there were lasting effects on interest rates in 
some countries.20 
The sharp slowdown in export growth in 1996 affected Thailand 
most severely. After growing nearly 25 percent in 1995, Thailand’s 
export revenues in dollars fell 1.3 percent in 1996. This partly 
reflected a significant drop in the terms of trade (see table A1). Export 
growth also fell sharply in Malaysia (26 percent to 5.8 percent) and 
the Philippines (32 percent to 17 percent) and more moderately in 
Indonesia (13.4 percent to 9.7 percent). The reasons cited for this 
slowdown included a significant decline in manufacturing export 
prices, most notably for semiconductors and other electronics 
products, and an appreciation of the dollar against the yen, which 
caused Southeast Asian effective exchange rates to appreciate (see 
Goldman Sachs, 1997). In Thailand, the slowdown in economic 
activity was associated with a significant shift in market sentiment 
starting in early 1996, as reflected in declining stock prices that 
did not hit other countries until later. Property markets were also 
adversely affected, which severely impaired the financial position of 
certain financial institutions. Press reports suggest that news of the 
drop in export growth in 1996 raised significant concerns about the 
sustainability of exchange rates and current account deficits. 
19. A Fortune article triggered rebuttals from Malaysian commentators; see L. 
Smith, “After Mexico, Who’s Next?” Fortune, 6 March 1995. The three other countries 
listed as vulnerable were in Latin America (namely, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile).
20. For alternative views on who was vulnerable and who was not, see Union 
Bank of Switzerland (1995a), Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996), and “No, Manila Is 
Not Mexico,” The Economist, 11 March 1995.553 Experiences with Current Account Deficits in Southeast Asia 
Finally, the shocks cited above triggered sporadic episodes of 
speculative pressure, particularly against the Thai baht from 1995 
onward. The eventual collapse of the baht in July 1997 triggered 
depreciations in the exchange rates of Indonesia, the Philippines, and 
Malaysia. Current account deficits switched sharply into surpluses around 
this time, reflecting the sudden withdrawal of external financing. 
The fact that current account deficits reflected high investment 
rather than consumption, together with the large share of FDI in 
financing, did not prevent a sudden stop and costly current account 
reversal. A number of factors made economies vulnerable to adverse 
shifts in market sentiment: (a) growing overinvestment; (b) financial 
fragility; (c) low foreign reserve cover for short-term external debt, 
accentuated by the fact that short-term debt was underestimated; and 
(d) currency mismatches.21
2.1.1 Overinvestment 
Despite the positive factors identified by the Monetary Authority 
of Singapore (1997) and Stiglitz (1996), rapid capital accumulation 
resulted in overinvestment and an inefficient use of resources in 
Southeast Asia up to about 1997.Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini 
(1999), who acknowledge the high marginal efficiency of investment 
in East Asia, find that incremental capital output ratios rose in Asian 
economies prior to the crisis, suggesting a deterioration in efficiency. 
Even before the crisis, the governor of Bank Indonesia expressed 
concern about economic inefficiency, as reflected in high incremental 
capital output ratios.22 In the case of Thailand, the first half of the 
1990s was characterized by reductions in the marginal productivity 
of capital, declining total factor productivity growth, low returns on 
assets, and falling capacity utilization (Roong, Thaicharoen, and 
Rodpengsangkaha, 2003, pp. 17–19 and 23–24).23 
21. An alternative view is that the Asian crisis was largely an unanticipated panic 
and economies were vulnerable regardless of their fundamentals (Sachs and Radelet, 
1998). However, the broader discussion and empirical evidence suggests that there 
was ongoing debate as to the vulnerability of Asian economies after the collapse of 
the Mexican peso and that fundamentals did play a role in vulnerability to crises. The 
clearest example of this is provided by Singapore, which experienced a massive real 
sector shock but no financial or currency crisis.
22. “Soedradjad Bemoans Economic Inefficiency,” Jakarta Post, 19 December 
1996. 
23. See Sarel (1997) for graphs illustrating declines in the marginal product of 
capital in Southeast Asian countries between 1990 and 1996. 554 Ramon Moreno
2.1.2 Financial fragility 
The Southeast Asian economies showed signs of rapid growth 
in risky lending.24 Domestic credit to the private sector picked up 
sharply in the first half of the 1990s, triggering booms in equity and 
property markets. The ratio of credit to GDP rose from around 70 
percent in 1990 to over 150 percent in 1997 in both Malaysia and 
Thailand (see figure 3). Over the same period, it rose to 50 percent 
in both Indonesia and the Philippines, although more sharply in the 
latter. These increases were partly the result of desirable financial 
deepening, but examination of banks’ asset quality suggests that 
a considerable proportion of the lending posed significant risks. In 
the case of Thailand, Moody’s expressed concern in early 1995 that 
credit continued to grow rapidly despite signs of overdevelopment, 
including the existence of more than 350 golf courses and high 
property vacancy rates.25 Nevertheless, Moody’s said it was not 
considering downgrading the credit ratings of Thai banks. Most of 
the large banks reportedly met Basel I capital adequacy requirements 
and maintained reserves equal to the size of their doubtful loans. 
Financial sector weaknesses were also recognized in other countries 
in the region. For example, at a press conference in November 1996, 
the governor of Bank Indonesia expressed concern for the growing 
concentration of bank credit in the property sector (over 18 percent 
of total credit), which had increased 26 percent from January 
to September 1996. In 1996, a study by the Central Bank of the 
Philippines found that property prices in three business districts 
in Manila had risen between 150 and 230 percent since 1994; the 
central bank’s governor at the time indicated that limits on credit 
to the property sector were being considered as a result.26 Certain 
prudential measures adopted in Malaysia also indicate concerns 
about developments in property markets. The central bank set a 
maximum loan-to-value ratio of 60 percent on loans to the real estate 
24. For a discussion of varying sets of macroeconomic and financial indicators 
and what they implied for Asian economies, see Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1996) and 
Glick (1999). 
25. See P. Montagnon, “Moody’s Warns of Thailand Bubble.” Financial Times, 9 
February 1995. A rapid increase in commercial bank lending to the private sector in 
the years before the 1994 peso crisis is one of the key vulnerabilities highlighted by 
Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996).
26. See “Indonesia Property Sector Credit Volume up 26 pct,” Asia Pulse, 12 
November 1996; see also J. Marozzi, “Manila Ponders Lending Limits,” Financial 








Sources: IMF; BIS calculations.
a. Trend series are estimated using a Hodrick-Prescott filter applied to annual data.
sector. It also raised reserve requirements to limit the rapid credit 
growth for consumption, which was seen as unproductive. Efforts 
were also made to cut the link between capital flows and domestic 
liquidity creation. 
A number of explanations have been offered for Asia’s growing 
financial fragility. First, the economies suffered from a series of 
credit market imperfections. Koh and others  (2005) provide empirical 
evidence suggesting that financial intermediaries in Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Thailand underpriced lending (specifically, the implicit 
option to default by borrowers) in property markets, leading to a boom 
and bust in property prices. The underpricing may have stemmed 
from lender optimism or disaster myopia in the boom period, from 557 Experiences with Current Account Deficits in Southeast Asia 
incentives that distort lending decisions, such as implicit guarantees 
by authorities, or from agency conflicts (for example, between banks 
and their borrowers or among shareholders). 
Incentives or implicit guarantees by authorities could be 
particularly important in Southeast Asia, where the banking sector 
supported an economic strategy oriented toward rapid economic growth. 
With regard to agency conflicts, Johnson and others (2000) report 
that weaknesses in corporate governance in Asia created a situation 
in which majority shareholders could step up their expropriation 
of the claims of minority shareholders during periods of investor 
uncertainty, leading to capital inflow reversals, falling stock prices, 
and currency depreciation. They find that weaknesses in corporate 
governance were a better predictor of currency depreciation than 
more widely used macroeconomic indicators. Relationship lending is 
another relevant market imperfection. Rajan and Zingales (1998) hold 
that Asia’s traditional relationship-based system of credit extension 
contributed to resource misallocation in the presence of large capital 
inflows by suppressing price signals. Moreover, because suppliers of 
external capital have few rights in a relationship system, they limited 
their risks by lending short term, which made the economies more 
vulnerable to sudden reversals in capital flows.27 In particular, the 
withdrawal of short-term funds could create liquidity problems for 
banks, leading them to recall their loans and forcing borrowers to 
cancel projects. This mechanism appears to have contributed to the 
severe economic downturns observed during the Asian crisis. 
Second, there were weaknesses in the prudential policies in 
place. Bongini, Claesens, and Ferri (2001) analyze a sample of 
283 financial institutions in Southeast Asia and Korea during the 
Asian financial crisis. One hundred and twenty of these experienced 
distress and 38 were eventually closed. The authors identify two 
predictors of distress: (a) variables that are typically monitored by 
banking supervisors using the CAMEL supervisory approach; and (b) 
connections with industrial groups or influential families, which the 
authors interpret as implying forbearance. These predictors suggest 
that difficulties in prudential supervision might have played a role 
in increasing financial vulnerability. 
Apart from playing a role in predicting financial distress, financial 
fragility appears to have directly contributed to market perceptions 
27. An alternative explanation for the emphasis on short-term lending by foreign 
creditors is lack of familiarity with domestic conditions.558 Ramon Moreno
of the sustainability of exchange rate regimes in Southeast Asia and 
the eventual interruption in external financing. For example, early in 
1997 an investment bank raised its assessment of the probability of a 
baht devaluation, partly because financial sector problems associated 
with a sharp downturn in property markets would make it very 
costly for the Bank of Thailand to raise interest rates to defend the 
currency.28 Press reports suggest that the analysis triggered a bout 
of speculation against the baht shortly after it was published. The 
speculation continued intermittently until the collapse of the currency 
in July 1997. While interest rates in Thailand did rise over the period 
as liquidity vanished from financial markets, the desire to dampen any 
interest rate hikes may explain why the Bank of Thailand depleted its 
foreign reserves significantly during this period to defend the peg.29
2.1.3 Low foreign reserve cover 
Recent research on early warning systems by Bussière and 
Fratzscher (2006) confirms that low foreign reserve cover of short-term 
debt is a predictor of crises. The foreign reserve cover of short-term debt 
in 1996 was below the (now) conventional threshold of one in Indonesia 
and Thailand (see table 4). If the need to cover current account deficits 
(measured ex post) in the following year is also taken into account, 
then the foreign reserve cover exceeded one only in Malaysia (1.4 in 
1996). Moody’s widely publicized downgrading of Thailand’s sovereign 
debt in September 1996 was motivated by the rapid and recent 
accumulation of short-term external debt, which by some estimates 
slightly exceeded foreign reserves. In contrast, Malaysia’s rating 
remained high for an extended period partly because of its high foreign 
reserve cover of short-term debt. Standard and Poor’s downgraded 
Malaysia’s sovereign rating in 1998, but the rating remained 
comparatively high in part because liquid international reserves were 
estimated at 170 percent of short-term external debt.30 An important 
28. See S. Kim, “Baht under Pressure,” Goldman Sachs Asian Weekly Analyst, 
5 February 1997. The analysis was related to Kaminsky and Reinhart’s (1999) 
research linking banking crises and currency crises, which first appeared in 1996 
as a working paper.
29. For a general discussion of this episode, see Moreno (1997).
30. “Malaysia’s Ratings Cut By S&P; Outlook Now Negative,” Standard and 
Poor’s CreditWire, 24 July 1998 (available at findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0EIN/
is_1998_July_24/ai_50195223). Malaysia’s high foreign reserve cover was deliberate. 
Cheong (2002) points out that Malaysia implemented a policy of maintaining a foreign 
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factor is that while FDI was indeed important in financing current 
account deficits, debt exposures were apparently underestimated 
in a number of countries. For example, the International Monetary 
Fund’s Independent Evaluation Office (2003, pages 12 and 26) states 
that Indonesia’s debt exposure was underestimated, particularly its 
short-term debt. Furthermore, market commentary indicates that 
officials could not closely monitor private lending flows (Union Bank 
of Switzerland, 1995b).31 Finally, apart from the debt burden being 
higher than was thought at the time, the share of short-term debt 
was sufficiently high to pose illiquidity risks. 
Table 4. Foreign Exchange Reserves / Short-Term External 
Debt Ratioa
Region or 
country 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Southeast Asiab 1.2 0.7 1.3 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.8 3.0 2.9 2.5
Indonesia 0.5 0.4 0.9 1.3 1.3 1.6 2.3 2.6 2.1 1.9
Malaysia 2.3 1.3 2.5 3.7 3.6 3.3 3.4 4.1 3.8 3.2
Philippines 1.2 0.8 1.1 1.7 1.8 1.7 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.0
Thailand 0.8 0.7 1.1 2.2 2.5 2.7 3.9 4.0 4.4 3.7
Source: IMF; national data; BIS.
a. Short-term external debt defined as short-term liabilities to BIS reporting banks: consolidated cross-border 
claims to all BIS reporting banks on countries outside the reporting area with a maturity up to and including 
one year plus international debt securities outstanding with a maturity up to one year; based on outstanding 
year-end positions
b. Unweighted averages of the countries shown.
2.1.4 Currency mismatches 
A significant amount of foreign currency borrowing in Southeast 
Asia was either unhedged or not effectively hedged. Such mismatches 
partly explain why the Asian currency crises of 1997–98 were 
associated with sudden stops in capital flows and sharp contractions in 
31. The estimated external-debt-to-exports ratios for 1995 in table A1—which 
are based on revised data that use BIS creditor statistics to supplement reports by the 
debtor countries—are much higher than estimates provided by one investment bank 
at the time. The investment bank estimated Thailand’s debt-to-exports ratio at 103 
percent, versus a revised estimate in table A1 of 177 percent; for the Philippines, the 
two figures are 135 percent versus 225 percent, and for Indonesia, 184 percent versus 
274 percent. The two estimates are similar only in the case of Malaysia (43 percent 
according to the investment bank versus 46 percent in the table). Another investment 
bank (Union Bank of Switzerland, 1996) used BIS statistics to obtain an estimate of 
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output while other currency crises were not. As a currency comes under 
depreciation pressure, the balance sheets of borrowers who have not 
hedged their foreign currency positions deteriorate sharply, as do those 
of their domestic bank lenders. This can lead to sharp reductions in 
expected returns and output, triggering sharp withdrawals in external 
financing as occurred in Asia in 1997–98. The precise dimensions of the 
problem were apparently not well understood at the time. For example, 
an Independent Evaluation Office (2003, page 26) report indicates that 
there was insufficient exploration of balance sheet risks, including 
those arising from currency (or maturity) mismatches in Indonesia. 
The difficulties of dealing with currency mismatches are illustrated 
by Allayanis, Brown, and Klapper (2000), who find that firms in East 
Asia tended to use foreign earnings as a substitute for hedging with 
derivatives. They also find, however, that firms that hedged with 
derivatives did no better during the Asian crisis than firms that did 
not hedge. One possible explanation is that the derivatives markets 
could not handle the sudden stops associated with the Asian crisis. 
The primary source of cover for meeting foreign currency obligations 
or managing foreign currency risks in this situation would either 
be the foreign reserves of the central bank (discussed above) or 
export revenues. To provide some perspective on the latter, figure 4 
illustrates the foreign currency share of total debt divided by the ratio 
of exports to GDP, which serves as an indicator of the extent to which 
Figure 4. Indicators of Currency Mismatcha
Percent
Sources: IMF; national data; BIS.
a. Foreign currency share of total debt divided by the ratio of exports to GDP, in percent. Asia is the weighted 
average of China, India, Korea, and Taiwan (China). Latin America is the weighted average of Argentina, Brazil, 
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foreign currency borrowing is not naturally hedged by exports.32 In 
1997, this ratio was highest in Indonesia and then Thailand, the two 
countries most severely affected by the crisis. The ratio was rising in 
the Philippines, and it was remarkably low in Malaysia.
3. POLICY RESPONSES
Current account deficits in Southeast Asia were an ongoing 
concern for policymakers throughout the first half of the 1990s.33 
Nevertheless, this concern appears to have been outweighed by the 
goal of maintaining rapid growth rates to achieve developed-country 
status. Early in the 1990s, when growth in major developed economies 
was sluggish, the Bank of Thailand (1992, p. 9) stated that the current 
account deficit reflected a shortfall in national saving that constrained 
long-run growth opportunities. Starting around 1994, when growth 
had picked up, commentators began to describe current account 
deficits as a sign of overheating and as an apparent proxy for the 
output gap.34 After the December 1994 collapse of the Mexican peso, 
press reports and market commentary indicate growing awareness by 
people concerned with economic issues that such deficits could pose 
risks to economic stability, and that there could be a need to tighten 
fiscal or monetary policy, not only to curb inflation but also to reduce 
the high current account deficits. For example, in discussing the 
effects of monetary policy tightening, the governor of Bank Indonesia 
highlighted the impact on imports and sought to alleviate concerns 
about the large current account deficits.35 The governor of the Bank of 
Thailand announced that monetary policy would proceed in “a cautious 
mode with the aim of reducing the current account deficit” and cited 
the central bank’s intention to keep inflation below five percent and 
the current account deficit below eight percent of GDP.36 
32. This indicator is also used by Goldstein and Turner (2004).
33. The discussion in this section refers to policy responses that have a bearing 
on the current account, dating to the early 1990s. For a general discussion of policy 
responses to capital inflows, which were a key consideration during that period, see 
Corbo and Hernández (1996). For more details on responses from 1995 onward, see, 
for example, Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1999). 
34. For example, see various issues of Morgan Guaranty’s World Financial Markets 
of the period.
35. Cited by Riyadi, “Govt. Vows to Cool Down Economy,” Jakarta Post, 26 
December 1996. 
36. “Central Bank to Restrict Use of Monetary Policy in 1997,” Agence France 
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The IMF’s advice in this period has not been fully disclosed, but 
the organization’s traditional model and publicly available information 
indicate that reducing current account deficits was a priority. For 
example, in addition to boosting growth, the IMF’s 1994 program for the 
Philippines sought to lower inflation, thereby enhancing competitiveness 
with a stable exchange rate, and reduce the current account deficit to a 
sustainable level of about 2.5 percent of gross national product (GNP) by 
1997, from about 6 percent in 1993.37 In 1995, the IMF representative 
to the Philippines suggested that the country was less vulnerable than 
Mexico because it had a smaller and falling current account deficit, 
as well as a lower debt service ratio, a lower share of short-term debt, 
and more flexible exchange rates.38 The Independent Evaluation Office 
(2003, p. 62) discussion of the Article IV consultation missions to 
Indonesia notes that the 1996 mission advice was “that the authorities 
should follow tight fiscal and monetary policies.” In 1997 it also called 
for “greater exchange rate flexibility and accelerated structural and 
banking reforms to maintain progress in reducing inflation, contain 
current account deficits, and minimize external risks.” The viewpoint 
that current accounts should be reduced influenced the policy inferences 
that were drawn from IMF research. For example, notwithstanding his 
conclusion that current account deficits in Southeast Asia did not reflect 
excess consumption, Ostry (1997) argues that risks from other factors 
(such as the level and composition of external liabilities, flexibility of 
macroeconomic policies, and the health of banking systems) would 
justify reducing current account deficits.
To reduce current account deficits, policymakers could seek to 
increase private or public saving or lower investment spending. 
Although investment spending was a major driver of the current 
account cycle, the authorities were reluctant to curb it because it was 
a centerpiece of these countries’ development strategies. It was argued 
that investment could increase production capacity and lower cost 
pressures and future current account deficits.39 In Thailand, reducing 
government investment spending would have affected infrastructure 
projects needed to ease severe bottlenecks impeding growth. Indeed, 
37. For a discussion, see “Philippines: Manila Transformed,” The Banker, 1 
September 1994.
38. “No, Manila Is Not Mexico,” The Economist, 11 March 1995.
39. For an example of reasoning along these lines, see the Bank of Thailand’s 
Annual Economic Report, 1995, as well as the Monetary Authority of Singapore (1997). 
The focus on the supply effects of investment, as opposed to its impact on the external 
balance via aggregate demand, is still apparent in discussions of China today, where 
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government spending in these areas was seen as lagging throughout 
the first half of the 1990s and was not considered the proximate cause 
of current account deficits. Investment was also a key element of 
Malaysia’s efforts to achieve developed country status by 2020. Bank 
Indonesia similarly cites the dilemma of pursuing both the goals 
of macroeconomic stability and the benefits of high investment: its 
annual report (1992/3, p 3) cites efforts to dampen domestic demand 
since 1990, but expresses concern about the slowdown in investment 
activity in 1992/93, which authorities believed could have an adverse 
impact on economic growth and exports in coming years. 
Policymakers instead sought to encourage private saving, in 
particular through the development of saving vehicles for households.40 
For example, the Bank of Thailand consistently highlighted the need to 
develop provident funds for employees. Such efforts to raise household 
saving in Thailand were not very successful, however. National saving 
was very high, but the household saving rate fell by over half between 
1989 and 1996, to around 7 percent (Pootrakul, Ariyapruchya, and 
Sodsrichai, 2005, chart 2.6, p. 9). An important medium-term factor 
accounting for this decline appears to have been a consumption boom. 
At the same time, it is not clear that efforts to increase private saving 
would have reduced current account deficits. In their study of a larger 
set of developing countries, Calderón, Chong, and Loayza (2002) find 
that private saving and investment are tightly linked, while public 
saving and investment are not. The empirical evidence available today 
thus suggests that increasing private savings would not necessarily 
have helped reduce current account deficits, whereas increasing public 
savings might have.41 
Increasing public saving was, in fact, considered, although in 
some ways, this had already occurred. Budgets in many cases were in 
surplus or were deemed sound or improving. The ratio of public debt 
to GDP was generally low: in 1996 it was estimated at 3.8 percent in 
Thailand, 15 percent in Indonesia, and 35 percent in Malaysia. The 
Philippines had a considerably higher ratio than its neighbors, at 56 
percent, but the Philippine budget recorded surpluses in 1994–96 
after a period of persistent deficits (see table A1). Measurement issues 
arose here, too. Fiscal positions were arguably not as sound as they 
appeared because they did not reflect possible contingent liabilities 
40. See, for example, the discussions in the Bank of Thailand’s and Bank Negara 
Malaysia’s annual reports. 
41. Further research is needed to determine the applicability of these results to 
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arising from fragile financial sectors (which today would be assessed 
through macroeconomic stress testing). 
Market sentiment changed around the mid-1990s, generating 
calls for fiscal policy to support current account deficit reduction. 
For example in 1996, the Indonesian finance minister promised to 
maintain fiscal surpluses in an effort to cool down the economy.42 In 
its Annual Economic Report 1996 (p. 8), the Bank of Thailand called 
on the government to reduce expenditures; this contrasts with earlier 
reports, which cited expenditure shortfalls. The report also called 
on the government to expand the tax base, particularly through 
consumption taxes, so as to increase public and private saving. 
In this setting, much of the burden of dealing with overheating and 
current account deficits arguably fell on monetary policy. However, 
the scope for an independent monetary policy in the first half of the 
1990s was limited by efforts to stabilize exchange rates against the 
U.S. dollar.43 As illustrated in figure 5 the baht was very stable against 
the dollar, as was the Philippine peso after late 1995. The Malaysian 
ringgit was more volatile, but it was largely trendless against the 
dollar until the collapse of the Thai baht in July 1997. Indonesia 
maintained a crawling depreciating band against the US dollar of 
around 4–5 percent a year.
In the first half of the 1990s, central bank intervention to prevent 
the exchange rate from appreciating was reflected in significant foreign 
reserve accumulation (table 1). This increased liquidity and contributed 
to the boom in credit and investment and the growing financial fragility 
cited earlier. Monetary authorities responded by applying a variety 
of tools to drain liquidity. First, they increased reserve requirements. 
Malaysia increased its reserve requirements eight times between 
1990 and 1997, while Indonesia did so twice for rupiah deposits (Van 
‘t Dack, 1999, table 7). Second, government or provident fund deposits 
with the central bank were increased (for example, Malaysia). Finally, 
the authorities undertook standard sterilization operations involving 
short-term borrowing from the money market, which in some cases 
(such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand) required the issuance 
42. Riyadi, “Govt. Vows to Cool Down Economy,” Jakarta Post, 26 December 
1996. 
43. Frankel and Wei (1994) show that East Asian currencies behaved like basket 
pegs with a high weight assigned to the U.S. dollar; the Monetary Authority of Singapore 
(2000) updates this study and shows that the role of the yen increased after the Asian 
crisis. Hernández and Montiel (2003) show that exchange rate volatilities in Asian 
currencies were low prior to the crises and rose significantly afterward, but less than 
pure floaters. Stabilizing the exchange rate was arguably also part of a high-growth 





of central bank instruments, owing to the lack of government paper. 
Given efforts to stabilize the exchange rate, these attempts to mop up 
liquidity attracted more capital inflows, which complicated monetary 
control.44 This is an implication of the Mundell-Fleming model and a 
feature of discussions of the so-called impossible trinity.
The outcomes for exchange rates are illustrated in figures 5 
and 6. Domestic monetary policies were significantly influenced by 
external conditions. Although occasionally disguised by high volatility, 
44. For a discussion of the problems of dealing with surging capital inflows, see Bank 




Sources: IMF; Bloomberg; Datastream; national data; BIS.
a. Monthly averages. An increase indicates an appreciation. The real effective rate is in terms of relative 
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movements in short-term interest rates in Southeast Asia appear to 
have mirrored swings in the U.S. Federal funds rate, sometimes with 
a lag (with the exception of the Philippines). Interest rates thus tended 
to fall between 1990 and 1993, when the Federal funds rate was falling, 
and subsequently rise, when the Federal funds rate began to rise. In 
some cases (such as Thailand), rates would rise significantly more than 
the Federal funds rate, at least temporarily, reflecting adverse shifts in 
market sentiment following the Mexican peso collapse. Movements in 
the nominal effective exchange rate also reflected external influences, 
in particular fluctuations in the dollar against the yen. Thus, nominal 
effective rates tended to depreciate until about 1995, paralleling the 
weakness of the dollar against the yen, and to appreciate thereafter 
as the dollar rebounded sharply. 







Sources: IMF; Bloomberg; Datastream; national data; BIS.
a. Monthly averages. One-month SBI rate for Indonesia, overnight rate for Malaysia, overnight reverse repo for 
the Philippines, three-month interbank rate for Singapore, and fourteen-day repo for Thailand. The real rate is 
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Significant tightening in monetary conditions only becomes 
apparent after 1995. Real short-term rates rose between 1995 and 
1997 in all four Southeast Asian countries, albeit with more volatility 
in Thailand (specifically, a significant dip in the second half of 1995). 
Real effective exchange rates also appreciated after 1995. Prior to 
that, nominal effective exchange rates had been on a depreciating 
trend and real exchange rates were generally flat, following a period 
of depreciation in the 1980s. The real exchange rate of Singapore 
appreciated steadily from 1985 onward; throughout the period, the 
country maintained large surpluses. The extended period of stable real 
exchange rates in the other Southeast Asian countries is remarkable 
because the very rapid growth of these economies and the importance 
of the tradable goods sector in this process suggest that exchange rates 
should have appreciated as a result of Balassa-Samuelson effects. 
Empirical research reveals that Balassa-Samuelson effects are not 
present in the countries in the sample.45 
Exchange rate appreciation thus did not play a direct role in the 
large trade or current account deficits in the first half of the 1990s.46 
Effective exchange rate appreciation may have been a factor in 
declining exports in 1996, contributing to market uncertainty and 
pressures on currencies, particularly in Thailand. Nevertheless, 
empirical evidence of overvaluation prior to the Asian crisis is mixed 
(see, for example, Chinn, 1998). 
Would allowing the exchange rate to adjust more freely have 
helped reduce current account deficits prior to the crisis in Southeast 
Asia? More flexible exchange rates would probably have had different 
effects in different periods. Before the Mexican peso collapse in 
December 1994, allowing the exchange rate to float freely would most 
likely have resulted in currency appreciation. Paradoxically, while 
freeing the exchange rate might have lowered export growth and 
increased imports through price effects, it could have reduced imports 
through income effects, specifically by dampening capital inflows 
and investment demand and by giving monetary authorities more 
scope to tighten. In any case, policymakers acted as if exchange rate 
stability mattered a great deal. Cheong (2002) indicates that freeing 
45. Drine and Rault (2004) find that the Balassa-Samuelson approach implies 
that the productivity differential between traded and nontraded goods sectors should 
be cointegrated with the corresponding relative prices; this is rejected by the data. One 
explanation is that there are other factors determining the real exchange rate that are 
not being taken into account.
46. A similar point is made in BIS (1996). 570 Ramon Moreno
the exchange rate was not considered an option by Malaysia, in part 
because financial markets tend to overshoot and excessive volatility 
could threaten macroeconomic stability.47 There was also concern in 
the region that appreciation would have hurt exporters, accentuated 
by growing competition with China in low-cost manufactures. 
After the Mexican peso crisis, the effects of allowing more exchange 
rate adjustment are uncertain, as there were occasional periods of 
depreciation pressure. The debates on the appropriateness of allowing 
currencies to depreciate to reduce current account deficits became 
more pointed in 1996, when export revenue growth declined sharply.48 
Efforts to stabilize the exchange rate nevertheless continued in the 
region until the Thai baht collapsed; these stabilization efforts are 
partly reflected in high interest rates in 1997. Efforts to defend pegs by 
allowing interest rates to rise were criticized for their contractionary 
effects, but they may have been motivated by the high costs of 
devaluation resulting from currency mismatches.
3.1 Prudential Measures and Capital Controls
Apart from macroeconomic policies, and despite generally open 
capital accounts, Asian policymakers occasionally adopted measures 
that could influence the size of the current account or its perceived 
sustainability. First, a set of measures whose motivation was 
“prudential” was designed to limit vulnerabilities. Second, controls 
were put in place to stop destabilizing speculation in currency or asset 
markets and to increase monetary policy independence. 
With regard to the first set of measures, several countries 
maintained restrictions on foreign borrowing or sought to influence 
it through regulation. In 1991, Indonesia imposed limits on foreign 
borrowing by the public sector (including private contracts with 
the public sector) and by banks, but these limits did not extend 
47. Latifah Merican Cheong was, at the time, a senior official at Bank Negara 
Malaysia.
48. For example, the Philippine Socioeconomic Planning Secretary, Cielito Habito, 
was quoted in August 1996 as saying that the peso was overvalued and foreign exchange 
policy was inadequate to control the country’s trade gap (see “Official Calls for Look 
at Forex Policy,” United Press International, 16 August 1996). That same month, 
Bank Indonesia Governor Soedradjad defended Indonesia’s exchange rate policy by 
saying it should not be designed merely to boost exports. This was partly in response 
to questions about a statement by Indonesia’s finance minister that the rupiah was 
slightly overvalued (see “Indon Forex Policy Not Only for Exports: Banker,” Asia Pulse, 
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to the private nonbank sector. Malaysia largely liberalized its 
capital account in 1973, but it maintained a set of foreign exchange 
controls that required approval on external borrowing above certain 
thresholds. Most (mainly long-term) external loans were only 
approved if firms earned foreign exchange. Cheong (2002) indicates 
that the goal of this restriction was largely prudential (that is, to 
ensure that entities incurring debt were able to service it), and it was 
not aimed at limiting borrowing per se. In the Philippines, public 
and private sector borrowing from abroad was subject to central 
bank approval in the mid-1990s. Controls were minimal in Thailand, 
although public sector foreign borrowing required approval by a 
foreign debt committee. For the private sector, the Bank of Thailand 
tried a somewhat different approach, implementing bank regulations 
to reduce the incentives for overseas financing. For example, in 1995, 
it sought to increase banks’ reliance on domestic deposits (as opposed 
to external borrowing) by requiring banks with high loan-to-deposit 
ratios to lower them toward the industry average. It also modified 
the net foreign exchange position limit imposed on commercial banks 
by counting at less than 100 percent (in some cases zero percent) 
foreign assets or certain types of commercial bank credits in foreign 
currencies that the Bank of Thailand deemed risky (such as those 
for purchasing vacant lands and for personal consumption). 
The effectiveness of these measures varied. Foreign borrowing by 
Indonesian firms contributed significantly to currency mismatches 
and the severity of its crisis, suggesting that its restrictions on foreign 
borrowing were not sufficiently effective to avert a crisis. 
As for the second set of measures, the main example in this 
period is that of Malaysia, which implemented a set of (temporary) 
controls directed at capital inflows in early 1994.49 The controls 
Malaysia imposed were motivated by three considerations.50 First, 
capital inflows were large, rising from 3 percent of GDP in 1988 to 
20 percent in 1993. Foreign capital was attracted by the high rates 
of return in Malaysia, buoyant equity markets, and expectations 
of ringgit appreciation. Second, while a large share of net capital 
49. For discussions of this episode, see Bank Negara Malaysia (1993 pp 61–62, 1999) 
and Glick and Moreno (1995). Another well-known example is Thailand’s attempt to 
curb speculation against the baht in May 1997 by limiting the ability of foreign residents 
to borrow baht and restricting links between the offshore and onshore markets. I do 
not focus on this here because these measures had no direct connection with efforts to 
influence current account balances and do not appear to have been effective (Edison 
and Reinhart, 2002).
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inflows were initially direct investment, other capital inflows became 
increasingly important as time passed, including short-term inflows 
and foreign borrowing through the banking sector. Third, the capital 
inflows circumvented existing controls and significantly eroded 
central bank measures to tighten liquidity. In an effort to discourage 
speculative flows, Malaysia had previously imposed ceilings on non-
trade-related swap transactions between commercial banks and their 
foreign customers (on the offer side on 14 March 1989 and on the bid 
side on 1 June 1992). Bank liquidity continued to increase, however, 
due to unrestricted trade and investment inflows. The central bank 
was particularly concerned about sharp ringgit appreciation against 
the dollar (around 9 percent between December 1993 and January 
1994), since “allowing the ringgit to appreciate sharply… from the 
inflows of funds that were of a very short-term nature would run the 
risk of an overshooting of the exchange rate. Any sudden reversals of 
the flows would have resulted in reverse pressure on the currency” 
(Bank Negara Malaysia, 1999, p. 289).
In response to these concerns, in January and February 1994, 
Bank Negara Malaysia imposed restrictions that limited foreign 
access to Malaysia’s banking sector and short-term financial 
instruments.51 Most of the restrictions were lifted within a year. 
These controls could have affected Malaysia’s current account 
in two ways. First, they could have heightened monetary policy 
independence and facilitated monetary policy tightening to reduce 
current account deficits, if policymakers so desired, by allowing 
interest rates to be increased without triggering capital inflows 
or appreciation pressures. As illustrated in figures 5 and 6, the 
controls were associated with a ringgit depreciation against the 
U.S. dollar, which by August 1994 had offset the sharp appreciation 
cited earlier. The imposition of controls was also initially associated 
with a visible drop in Malaysian interest rates, followed by a rise 
that broadly tracked the increase in the Federal funds rate until 
the beginning of 1996. The gap between the Malaysian overnight 
rate and the U.S. Federal funds rate fell from nearly 4 percentage 
51. The central bank imposed a ceiling on the net external liability position of 
domestic banks (excluding trade-related and direct investment inflows); prohibited sales 
by residents to nonresidents of short-term securities (such as banker’s acceptances, 
negotiable certificates of deposit, Bank Negara or Treasury bills, government securities 
maturing in one year or less, and any private security with a residual maturity of one 
year or less); prohibited bid-side commercial banks forward transactions with foreigners 
and nontrade related swaps.573 Experiences with Current Account Deficits in Southeast Asia 
points in November 1993 to around 41 basis points in January 1994; 
it later turned negative until about the fourth quarter of 1995. The 
controls thus appear to have stemmed appreciation pressures, and 
Malaysian authorities appear to have been able to raise interest rates 
by somewhat less during the period of Federal Reserve tightening. 
While growth slowed in Malaysia in 1994, it still ranged from around 
9 to 10 percent in 1994–96. The controls were apparently not intended 
to reduce the current account deficit, which grew from 4.6 percent 
of GDP in 1993 to a peak of 9.7 percent in 1995.
Second, controls could have limited Malaysia’s external debt and 
financial vulnerability, reducing the likelihood or costs of current 
account reversal at least for a time. It appears that vulnerability 
was in fact reduced. Malaysia’s overnight rate remained somewhat 
below the Federal funds rate (and was also much less volatile than 
the Thai short-term rate) after controls were lifted and despite 
the turbulence that followed the collapse of the Mexican peso. A 
number of indicators suggest that controls may have helped reduce 
vulnerability. First, capital controls were associated with a leveling 
off in portfolio inflows. Second, Malaysia’s external vulnerability 
indicators were better than its neighbors along several dimensions 
around 1995: (a) the debt-to-exports ratio, which was already 
lower than in neighboring countries because of Malaysia’s policy 
of regulating external debt, fell by around 9 percentage points to 
46.4 percent between 1993 and 1995; (b) foreign reserve cover was 
higher than in other Southeast Asian economies and (c) currency 
mismatch indicators were much better in Malaysia than in some of 
its neighbors in 1996, on the eve of the Asian crisis. However, while 
the ratio of domestic bank credit to the private sector to GDP fell 
(from 108 in 1992 to 106 in 1993), it increased again after capital 
controls were imposed in early 1994 (figure 3). 
Three points may be made here. First, Malaysia’s approach around 
this time appears to be broadly consistent with a strategy of reducing 
external vulnerability while maintaining high growth rates. Second, 
while in hindsight it would have been desirable to tighten policy by 
more, this was not necessarily obvious at the time given relatively low 
external vulnerability, rapid growth rates, and Singapore’s history of 
sustaining large current account deficits for an extended period. Third, 
the various preventive measures—namely, restrictions on external 
debt, temporary capital controls, and reserve accumulation—were 
ultimately not sufficient to prevent a crisis. Because of its better 
balance sheet position, Malaysia was able to weather the 1997–98 574 Ramon Moreno
Asian crisis without IMF support. However, the decline in output 
in 1998 was still very large. This and speculative pressures in the 
aftermath of the Russian crisis led to the imposition of capital controls 
in September 1998.52 
4. CONCLUSIONS
This description of Southeast Asia’s experience with current 
account deficits illustrates how high growth rates can be associated 
with significant external and domestic vulnerabilities. Rapid growth 
was linked to high rates of investment spending, which drove the 
current account cycle. It was also associated with increasing financial 
fragility, as suggested by rising credit-to-GDP ratios, high external 
debt exposure (particularly in short-term instruments), and currency 
mismatches. 
Awareness of these vulnerabilities was incomplete, especially 
with regard to the extent of short-term debt exposure and currency 
mismatches. Also, the push for growth apparently restricted the range 
of policy responses. Policymakers sought to reduce current account 
deficits by encouraging more saving, but this was difficult to achieve 
in some of the countries discussed in this paper because saving rates 
were already high. Until the eve of the crisis, there appeared to be little 
desire to curb investment spending or to tighten fiscal policies that 
were generally considered sound or improving. The scope for monetary 
tightening was limited by efforts to stabilize currencies against the 
U.S. dollar, which was broadly consistent with a rapid-growth strategy 
during periods of dollar weakness against the yen. Monetary conditions 
did not tighten significantly until 1995. Real effective exchange rates 
did not appreciate until the mid-1990s, and they do not appear to have 
played a significant role in explaining large current account deficits up 
to that time. This conclusion is reinforced by research indicating that 
the impact of the exchange rate on current accounts or trade is weak 
in Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, sharp exchange rate appreciation 
52. Capital controls imposed in September 1998 were also intended to give 
policymakers the leeway to boost growth, as well as to interrupt speculative pressures 
against the ringgit. By that time, however, Malaysia’s current account had switched 
to surplus, so I do not focus on this episode here. The episode illustrates that even 
economies with relatively strong balance sheet positions can experience significant 
speculative pressures. These controls are discussed extensively elsewhere; see for 
example, Bank Negara Malaysia (1999), Cheong (2002), Edison and Reinhart (2002), 
Tamirisa (2004), and Kaplan and Rodrik (2002).575 Experiences with Current Account Deficits in Southeast Asia 
after the mid-1990s appears to have contributed to weaker exports 
and adverse shifts in market sentiment.
Policymakers occasionally used controls as a device to reduce 
vulnerabilities, to insulate their economies from market volatility, and 
to gain monetary independence. In Malaysia prior to the crisis, these 
measures appear to have reduced external vulnerability, although 
the imposition of capital controls in 1994 was not subsequently 
associated with a significant reduction in either growth or current 
account deficits.
The behavior of macroeconomic indicators since 1997–98 suggests 
that one of the primary lessons Southeast Asian economies took from 
the crisis is a strong desire to reduce vulnerabilities. Some policymakers 
now see a large current account deficit as a sign of possible excess, 
particularly when accompanied by evidence of other imbalances, such 
as rapid credit growth and very high, and possibly unsustainable, 
rates of investment and growth. Emphasis is increasingly placed on 
reducing external vulnerabilities. In line with this interpretation, 
growth rates have been much lower, on average, in the 2000s than 
they were in the first half of the 1990s. Current accounts have been 
in surplus for most of the period since the Asian crisis. In the case of 
Malaysia, they have increased sharply and are beginning to resemble 
the rising current account pattern observed in Singapore. Investment 
spending has only gradually recovered. Credit-to-GDP ratios remain 
well below the peaks observed in 1997–98. Foreign reserves now exceed 
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